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1. Introduction 
 
The personalization of politics is a popular topic of contemporary political science. 
Personalization, however, refers to several related yet distinct concepts in the literature, which 
often leads to confusion. On the one hand, it is commonly used to describe the phenomena of 
presidentialization, which is the process of a leader gradually becoming the most important 
representative of his or her party
3
. On the other hand, personalization is also a trait of the 
individual candidates and representatives. In this sense, personalization is a tool for politicians 
to create an image of themselves which differentiates them both from their parties and their 
fellow candidates (Karvonen, 2009). This article considers personalization in the latter way 
and does not use the term in connection with party leaders. 
 The aim of the analysis is to uncover the micro-level determinants of personalization 
and constituency orientation within the individual Members’ of Parliament (MPs) campaign 
strategies under circumstances that heavily favour party-centeredness. The main hypothesis is 
that despite the party-centred logic of Hungarian politics, personalization prevails in a 
measurable way
4
. Parties play a distinctive role in the above causal mechanism. It is because 
the direct effects of the components of the electoral system favouring candidate-centeredness 
in campaigning have to be adjusted to the actual political circumstances, and their indirect 
effects posed on party strategies should be taken into account as well. However, in order to 
explore this mechanism in detail, conducting a case study seems more appropriate than 
performing a cross-sectional analysis. The most common criticism of cross-country research 
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 Among others, this interpretation of personalization might be connected to the growing literature on 
political branding. This line of literature claims that modern parties are very similar to what marketing 
studies call brands on the one hand, and that voters use the personality traits of party leaders to 
evaluate parties on the other (Garzia, 2013; Smith, 2009). 
4
 For similar reasoning see (Karlsen and Skogerbø, 2013; Russo, 2011). 
is that it is difficult to identify the casual effects independently from other cross-country 
factors (Jun and Hix, 2010). Hence, it might be better to focus the attention exclusively on a 
single country, and thereby hold cultural and historical aspects constant. 
 This study investigates Hungary as a critical case (Gerring, 2007; Rohlfing, 2012) of 
mixed-member electoral systems. The analysis aims to explore candidate- and district-
centeredness in the campaign of the Hungarian general elections in 2010. While several other 
potential dimensions
5
 could also be taken into account, campaign efforts are the ones which 
are under the strongest control of the party centre. The fact that we investigate under 
circumstances that leave little room for the recognition of individual preferences and 
characteristics, makes the critical case fashion more powerful.  
 In the next section, I show why the Hungarian case can be treated as a critical one. 
This is followed by the theoretical and empirical introduction of the dependent and 
independent variables, which also includes the formulation of several sub-hypotheses that 
establish the effects of these variables on personalization and constituency orientation during 
campaign. The aim of this article is to systematically explore a specific aspect of 
personalization in line with the international literature on representation, personalization and 
personal voting. 
 
 
2. Electoral rules and personalization 
 
The literature discussing the effect of electoral rules on personalization emphasizes four main 
components. (1) Regarding the consequences for the electoral connection, the debate revolves 
around the effects of majority and proportional electoral formulas. The differences between 
the two major types of electoral systems are related to the application of single member versus 
multi-member constituencies. One of the most frequently discussed characteristics of the 
single member majority systems is that they create a strong accountability linkage (Lancaster, 
1986; Norris, 2000, 2004; Scholl, 1986). Since a district has a single representative, the voters 
will be able to determine who to reward or punish for the positive or negative outcomes 
(Lancaster, 1986; Lancaster and Patterson, 1990; Norris, 2004). Conversely, in Multi-Member 
Districts (MMDs), the accountability link becomes blurred and the incentive to free-ride 
increases because there is a territorial overlap among the legislators (Heitshusen, Young, and 
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 For instance representational attitudes, constituency service or work in parliament. 
Wood, 2005). In MMD-systems, members are more accountable to the party leadership than 
to the electorate (Norris, 2004), which essentially makes the contest for re-election a fight for 
higher positions on the party list (Curtice and Shively, 2000). (2) Students of electoral 
systems agree that the electoral formula is just one factor among many, and is far from being 
the most important. In fact, the electoral competition in systems using multi-member 
constituencies might be more candidate-oriented (especially with open and flexible party lists) 
than under Single Member Districts (SMDs). The key aspect here is the ballot structure that 
creates highly distinctive subgroups among systems applying MMD. The reason why we 
cannot consider the group of MMD-systems homogeneous in terms of how they affect the 
electoral connection is because of the different incentives that open- (preference ballot) and 
closed-list (party ballot) rules offer. The key factor here is intra-party competition. Carey and 
Shugart’s  main point is that electoral rules are important not because they distribute mandates 
between parties, but because they allocate “seats to specific candidates within parties” as well 
(Carey and Shugart, 1995, p. 417). Incumbent candidates in open list systems face a “double 
incentive” just because they have to defend their seats not only against the candidates of other 
parties but against their fellow party members as well (Curtice and Shively, 2000; Gallagher 
and Holliday, 2003; Heitshusen et al., 2005; Morgenstern and Swindle, 2005). (3) Regardless 
of the ballot structure and the incentives to free-ride, district magnitude is also considered to 
increase the voters’ confusion about who to approach with their problems and who to blame 
or reward (Cain et al., 1987; Norris, 2004; Scholl, 1986). However, this effect is rather 
complex and depends on the structure of the ballot as well. Under closed party lists the 
increasing district magnitude decreases the incentives to personalize, while open list systems 
demonstrate a reversed effect (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen, 
2005). (4) Last, but not least, candidate selection rules exert a significant effect on 
personalization under the given electoral rules. Several scholars have shown that the way the 
party selects its candidates is one of the most important determinants of whether the system 
rewards or punishes candidate-centeredness (Atmor, Hazan, and Rahat, 2011; Carey and 
Shugart, 1995; Mitchell, 2000; Norris, 2004). The inclusiveness and decentralization of the 
nomination process greatly affect candidate incentives to personalize (Atmor et al., 2011). 
 The Hungarian electoral system is one of the most complex systems in Europe. 
Representatives were elected on three tiers. 176 mandates were distributed in single member 
districts by the rules of absolute majority in the first round, and relative majority in the 
second. 210 seats were allocated from the party list levels based on the principle of 
Proportional Representation (PR). A minimum of 152 and a maximum of 58 MPs received 
regional and national level mandates respectively from the closed party lists. Voters cast two 
votes: one for a candidate in their SMD and one for the party list in their region (megye). The 
sum of all non-utilized votes from the first valid rounds on both the SMD and the regional list 
tier formed the basis of mandate allocation on the national level. Non-utilized votes from the 
nominal tier are votes that were cast to the losing candidates. Votes that were not needed to 
win any mandates on the regional tier add to the national level vote count as well. 
 The Hungarian electoral system
6
 is often placed between being purely party- and 
candidate-centred (Colomer, 2011). The argument is that due to its direct effect on legislators 
and candidates, the nominal tier softens party-centeredness created by two tiers of closed 
party lists. However, taking the candidate nomination practices of the Hungarian parties into 
account (Marjai, 2012; Papp, 2013), potential SMD candidates have to compete for the 
party’s support first which results in that – especially in safe constituencies – the election of 
individual candidates is often decided at the nomination stage (Atmor et al., 2011). Thus, first 
tier candidates are only motivated to emphasize their merits independent from the party in the 
case there is an expectation from the party centre. Contrary to the commonly held view in the 
international literature, in the Hungarian electoral system the direct effect of the first tier often 
diminishes due to the way candidates are selected. Nominal tier effects will not necessarily 
emerge through individual motivations but rather indirectly, through party expectations. 
Therefore, when discussing the effect of the Hungarian electoral system on personalization, 
one has to place the mixed-member setup into a dominantly party-centred context to be able 
to assess the mechanisms behind the causal effects. Consequently, the Hungarian case can be 
perceived as a least likely one with respect to the main hypothesis. 
 The following analysis uses MP-survey data acquired by the Hungarian Election Study 
during the summer of 2010
7
. Altogether 231 legislators were interviewed using the 
standardized questionnaire of the Comparative Candidate Survey. One may argue that 
focusing on the 2010 campaign could potentially distort the results because of the imbalance 
of parties at the 1
st
 tier of the electoral system
8
. In this respect, the dominance of Fidesz-
KDNP on the first two tiers could make the case too peculiar to draw conclusions about the 
whole system. However, oddly enough, these circumstances give more power to the findings. 
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 Mixed member majority with partial compensation (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001). 
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 Fidesz-KDNP won a majority that post-transition Hungary has rarely seen before. With an overall 
52.7 % of the votes they secured 2/3 (68.1 %) of the seats in the Hungarian Parliament. Furthermore, 
Fidesz and KDNP won 98.2 % of the 176 constituency seats, and 59.5% of the seats available at the 
regional party lists. 
Candidate selection in Fidesz-KDNP is regarded as the most centralized with the most 
exclusive selectorate (Marjai, 2012; Papp, 2013). Thus, the electoral system must have 
stronger party-centred effects on member attitudes and behaviour than it would be the case in 
a more balanced partisan set-up with the selection strategies being less centralized. Therefore, 
if different forms of personalization are found under such circumstances, then it is reasonable 
to expect that such mechanisms prevail in less extreme conditions as well. Also, it is likely 
that party-centeredness does not rule out other forms of representation. 
 Furthermore, the chance of winning is another relevant issue that is influenced by the 
election year. Many scholars argue (Curtice and Shively, 2000; Heitshusen et al., 2005; 
Herron, 2002; Jun and Hix, 2010; Lundberg, 2006; Sieberer, 2010) that the candidates’ 
chances of winning affects their behaviour. In this respect, 2010 was a peculiar year too, 
because opinion polls prior to the election suggested that virtually no SMD candidates would 
be able to defeat the nominees of Fidesz. Thus, the chance of winning probably did not play a 
substantial role in 2010, at least not on the most personalized level of the electoral system. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that safe seats make the system even more party centred, as the 
decision of who gets elected remains truly in the hands of the selectors. Therefore, the 2010 
Hungarian elections offer an extreme case of party-centeredness, which, according to the 
conventional scholarly views, is unlikely to show signs of personalization and constituency 
orientation. Finding empirical evidence for personalization under these circumstances would 
thus provide strong support for the main hypothesis. 
 
 
3. Campaign norms, means and agenda 
 
This article follows Zittel and Gschwend (2008) in the conceptualization of the dependent 
variables. Out of their four components with which they measure campaign personalization, 
three will be used here
9
. (1) Campaign norms contrast candidate- and party-centeredness 
within the context of campaigning
10
. 32.2 % (N=69) of the responding MPs would distribute 
their resources evenly between personal and party campaigns. Furthermore, the dominance of 
party campaign prevails: 15.6 % (33) of the members favoured pure party campaigns, while 
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 The fourth dimension covers the organizational side of the campaign and investigates the proportion 
of the individual candidates’ campaign budgets financed by the party centre. 
10
 „What was the primary aim of your campaign? Where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 to 
11, where 1 means ’to attract as much attention as possible for me as a candidate’ and 11 means ’to 
attract as much as possible attention for my party’?” 
only 4.2 % (9) prefer personal vote-seeking exclusively (see Figure 1). However, if merging 
the categories below and above the mode, a more balanced picture appears. Only a slightly 
larger group of representatives claimed the partisan focus of their campaigns to be more 
important than the personal aspects: 34.6 % (74) favoured party campaigns, whereas 33.2 % 
(71) preferred personalization. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
(2) Campaign means refer to the modes of separating the “candidate and party image in the 
public eye” (Zittel and Gschwend, 2008, p. 989) 11. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 
number of different personalized campaign tools used by the candidates. The horizontal scale 
entries indicate the number of personalized tools MPs used during their campaigns in 2010. 
44.1 % (N=102) claimed to use all methods listed, while 10.2 % (24) reported to apply none 
of them. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
(3) Third, with regards to campaign agenda, Zittel and Gschwend argue that they “should 
highlight issues that are relevant for the particular constituencies” (Zittel and Gschwend, 
2008, p. 989). Raising district-specific issues communicates not only that the candidate cares 
about the constituency but that he or she is familiar with the characteristics of the local area as 
well. More than two-third (69.2 % (N=144)) of the respondents claimed that during the 
campaign they mentioned problems specifically related to their districts which otherwise were 
left unattended by the party. Regarding the topics raised, issues are either rather general or 
very specific. General issues grasp problems with a slight local concern, like corruption, 
public safety, infrastructure, unemployment, and health care. 61.6 % of the MPs touching 
upon locally relevant issues mentioned general problems. Specific campaign topics relate to 
these rather general fields of interests as well. What makes these tied to the districts more is 
that they mention something very concrete about their relation to the district. They often 
concern local products (for example chocolate, grain and fruit), issues of environment 
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 „Did you use the following in the course of your campaign?” (yes/no). (a) Personal campaign 
posters, (b) personal ads in the local press, (c) office hours, (d) social gatherings, (e) personal flyers, 
(f) personal spots in radio, TV, and movie houses, (g) personal website. 
protection and very concrete mentions of diverse infrastructural projects as well. 38.4 % 
addressed very specific issues in their campaigns
12
. 
 There is a strong association between the three aspects of campaigning. Those 
legislators who pursued more personalized campaigns also applied personalized campaign 
tools in a significantly greater numbers than members leading party-centred campaigns
13
. 
Similarly, MPs who preferred more personalized campaigns covered district-specific topics 
significantly more often than promoters of the party
14
. The pursuit of personalization appeared 
along all dimensions of campaigning, however, due to the different nature of these aspects, 
correspondence is far from perfect. Norms represent a perception rather than the true state of 
the campaigns. It measures how representatives felt they manoeuvred between pursuing 
partisan and personal goals. Conversely, campaign means are to a great extent subject to party 
influence. The range of applied tools is usually assigned by the party centre to the individual 
candidates. 
 Interestingly, all three components show a firm association with the legislators’ 
attitudes toward representation
15
. Constituency oriented MPs placed themselves higher on the 
scale of campaign norms
16
, and applied a significantly larger number of personalized 
campaign tools
17
. Furthermore, 52.1 % of these MPs touched upon local issues in their 
campaigns, which is a significantly higher percentage than in the case of legislators with a 
different focus of representation
18
. 
 
 
4. Explanatory factors 
 
In the following, eight explanatory factors will be introduced that are hypothesized to 
influence the levels of the dependent variables outlined above. Three of the independent 
variables are connected to the nominal tier of the electoral system. (1) The place of 
nomination does not need any introduction as its effect can be derived from the section 
reviewing the effect of electoral rules on candidate-centeredness. MPs competing in the single 
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 Concrete issues are not mentioned in order to preserve respondent anonymity. 
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 There are different opinions about whom an elected member of parliament should primarily 
represent. In your view, how important is it for you to represent the following groups? (a) 
constituency, (b) party electorate, (c) a specific social group, (d) all the citizens in the country. 
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 F = 5.274***, Eta = .265 
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 F = 10.011***, Eta = .342 
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 χ2 = 13.533***, V = .257 
member constituencies carry out more personalized campaigns than list candidates
19
. (2) It is 
not irrelevant, however, from which position they started campaigning: from the position of 
the incumbent, or the one of the challenger
20
. It is hypothesized that the campaigns of the 
incumbents are more candidate-oriented, as they can build on their visibility in a greater 
fashion than the challengers, have access to resources enabling an extended usage of 
campaigns tools as well as possessing a greater amount of crucial information in terms of 
local issues. (3) Thirdly, one should take into account the effect of former SMD experience
21
, 
which might manifest in the form of habits during the 2010 electoral campaign. Experience of 
personalization in the past could appear in the behaviour of current MPs even if this time they 
were not nominated to fill in the position. 
 The fourth variable is related to local politics (4). The parties’ dilemma with regards to 
local politicians is known (Navarro, 2009, p. 7). On the one hand, local politicians might do a 
great service to the party due to their extended local connections, the knowledge of locally 
relevant issues and their local electoral base. According to several authors, voters seek to find 
the balance between national and local representation: they choose parties, but at the same 
time they prefer candidates who are familiar with the peculiarities of the local scenery 
(Putnam, 1976; Shugart et al., 2005; Tavits, 2010). On the other hand, characteristics that 
serve the party’s interest during election time could very well undermine party unity: local 
politicians in Europe often step up as the representatives of interests independent from the 
party (Dewogheraele, Berton, and Navarro, 2008; Tavits, 2010). I hypothesise that local 
politicians pursue personalized and locally oriented campaigns. 
 Seniority plays an important role in the literature explaining personalization (5). 
According to Norton and Wood’s intra-generational hypothesis, newcomers are more 
constituency-oriented than their colleagues with experience in the national legislature. The 
reason for this is that in the case of first term MPs, neglecting constituency needs has a greater 
negative impact on their electoral support by the reason of their relatively weak electoral 
embededdness (Fenno, 1978; Norton and Wood, 1990). The hypothesis of new members 
being more constituency-oriented, however, works mostly in the politics of the Anglo-Saxon 
world. In closed list electoral systems, candidates rather wrestle for the party’s goodwill than 
for the voters’ support (Heitshusen et al., 2005). Similarly, in SMD-centred electoral systems, 
with centralized candidate selection, new legislators might find it more rewarding to follow 
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 1 = SMD candidate, 0 = List candidate 
20
 1 = Incumbent, 0 = Challenger 
21
 1 = Held an SMD mandate prior to 2006, 0 = Has never held an SMD seat 
the party lines to express their commitment. Due to centralized candidate selection and the 
role of the closed list tiers in Hungary, the latter outcome is expected: newcomers
22
 pay less 
attention to personalization and constituency-orientation than more experienced legislators. 
 The sixth independent variable is party leadership
23
 positions (6). Wahlke and 
colleagues (Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, 1962) argue that the parties play an 
important socializing role in the process of the development of role perceptions. MPs who 
served in high ranking party positions tend to consider the party as the focus of representation 
(Zittel, 2012) instead of the constituency. Thus, party leaders are expected to be less 
constituency-oriented and will pursue less personalized electoral campaigns. Seventh, (7) 
ideological distance from the party might also play an important role in explaining campaign 
personalization (Zittel and Gschwend, 2008). The concept entails that the degree of 
personalization is in congruence with how far the MP places himself from the party
24
. 
Willingly increasing the distance between the candidate and the party in the eye of the voters 
might be traced back to an increased difference on the ideological spectrum. The eighth 
explanatory factor is the party itself (8), to which two distinct causal mechanisms could be 
attached. A difference between old and new parties is hypothesized on the basis of their 
differing collective experiences in terms of personalization and constituency-centeredness. 
Legislators of old parties (Fidesz and MSZP) come from a political environment that sets a 
high value to the single member districts, as both experienced electoral success on the 
nominal level which eventually enabled them to win the elections. Moreover, electoral rules 
favour larger parties on the majority tier, leaving small parties focusing their resources on 
party campaign. On the other hand, it is to be argued that during the 2010 campaign, 
candidates of MSZP consciously tried to create a distance between them and the party (Ughy, 
2011), while Fidesz contestants relied on the party brand utilizing the popularity of the party 
label (Mihályffy, 2011). 
 
 
5. Modelling campaign personalization 
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 1 = Newcomer, 0 = Senior member 
23
 1 = National party leader, 0 = Backbench politician. Only legislators listed on their parties’ websites 
in party leadership are considered leaders in this study. 
24
 Legislators were asked to place themselves and their parties on a left-right scale ranging from 1 to 
11. Ideological distance is measured as the absolute difference between these two values. 
In this section, the above hypotheses will be tested using multivariate models
25
. To model the 
effect of the different independent variables on the relative perceived value of personalization 
to party campaign, simple OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) models were estimated. Results will 
be evaluated on the 5 % level of significance. The outputs of Table 1 reveal that electoral 
interests in the constituencies pose a large effect on how members evaluate the importance of 
personal to party campaigns. SMD candidates placed themselves – ceteris paribus - 3 points 
higher on average than list candidates on the scale from 1 to 11, where higher values represent 
a higher level of personalization. The value of personalization appears on the nominal tier of 
the electoral system, regardless of the party centeredness of Hungarian politics. Other 
significant variables set to zero, the average SMD candidate takes 5.6 on the dependent 
variable measuring campaign norms, from where he or she is further “pushed” to the personal 
end of the continuum by career factors like local political background and incumbency. Thus, 
despite the dominance of the party over the person in the Hungarian electoral system, the 
original impact of the nominal level was not overridden by pure partisan strategy. Candidates 
and parties still think that personalization is a fairly practicable strategy of voter persuasion. 
Again, the features of the electoral system that maintain the superiority of the party – and the 
observation that personalization can occur under such rules - enables us to conclude that party 
interests are served by a certain level of personalization. Otherwise one could not observe this 
level of personalization, especially when it comes to distributing resources between personal 
and party campaigns. 
 
Table 1. Results of the OLS estimation of campaign norms 
 B (s.e.) B (s.e.) 
Candidacy 3.164 (.449)*** 3.01 (.456)*** 
Incumbent (2006-2010) 1.023 (.499)** .817 (.422)* 
SMD MP before 2006 -.602 (.746) -.353 (.696) 
Local political position 1.077 (.513)** .651 (.368)* 
Newcomer -.412 (.456) .281 (.401) 
Party leader -.178 (.415) -.286 (.327) 
Ideological distance .112 (.157) .097 (.133) 
Jobbik  -.314 (.602) 
KDNP  -.71 (.527) 
LMP  -3.673 (1.415)*** 
MSZP  1.564 (.435)*** 
Intercept 2.478 (.581)*** 2.629 (.585)*** 
N 206 206 
F 19.18*** 10.08*** 
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 The data will be weighted to ensure representativeness along mandate type and party affiliation. 
Adj. R
2
 .322 .424 
Entries are coefficients; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Contrasts: Candidacy - list candidates, Incumbent (2006-2010) – members not holding SMD 
mandates between 2006 and 2010, SMD MP before 2006 - has never held an SMD seat, Local 
political positions - members not holding any elected local positions, Newcomer - members 
with at least one term experience as national representatives, Party leader - backbench MPs, 
Party - Fidesz. 
Coefficients represent the change in the value of the dependent variable due to a one unit 
change in the related independent variable. 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
. 
 
Based on the results of Table 1, nominal level experience too seems to influence how MPs 
perceive the value of personal campaigning. However, past experience is only important as 
long as it involves serving as an SMD MP in the preceding term (2006-2010). Incumbents 
were more eager to focus their resources to personalized appeal than members with no first 
tier experience. Nominal level mandates held before 2006 do not seem to substantially affect 
campaign norms in a multivariate setting, which undermines the habitual explanations when it 
comes to norms of campaigning. Additionally, the joint effect of incumbency and previous 
experience (which are designed to measure SMD experience together) is not significant on a 5 
% level
26
. 
 The effect of local positions points to the hypothesized direction. Filling in local 
political positions has a significant positive effect on the value of personal campaigns. Elected 
local politicians pursue more personalistic goals in their campaigns, even if they are not 
entering the first tier competition. Everything left unchanged, local politicians prefer personal 
vote-seeking to furthering the party reputation by 1.077 units on average. The positive effect 
of local political background suggests two things. First, personalization could become a habit 
to the local politicians. Admittedly, the dynamics of representation in local politics has the 
tendency of shifting the focus to an even lower level, than it would be expected based on the 
national level connection (Keil and Papp, 2011)
27
. Secondly, putting a larger emphasis on the 
person might be a conscious strategy to maintain local popularity which leads to obtaining 
additional votes for the party candidate. 
 Regarding seniority, ideological distance from the party and party leadership positions, 
members tend not to differ as far as the choice between personal and party reputation seeking 
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 F=2.91*. Null hypothesis: the coefficients of incumbency and SMD mandates before 2006 are both 
zero. 
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 Local representatives tend to focus on problems of areas smaller than their constituencies. This is 
especially true in the case of councilmen elected on party lists. 
goes. Fixing the values of significant variables at zero, members position their campaign 
strategies closer to the party-centred end (2.478 units), and this value remains stable when 
changing member characteristics with regards to the above factors. 
 Results of the above models are somewhat altered when party affiliation is controlled 
for. The dominating effect of candidacy still prevails, however, the impact of local positions 
and incumbency does not appear as important. The directions of the effects do not change, but 
the degree is substantially altered. Results regarding these variables are no longer 
generalizable to the whole parliament considering a 5 % level of significance. The analysis 
sets Fidesz as contrast in evaluating the effect of party affiliation by the reason of its 
dominance in the SMDs and the most centralized candidate selection strategy. Jobbik and 
KDNP members do not differ from Fidesz in terms of their perception of how important 
personalization may be. The members of LMP pursued more party centred campaigns, while 
MSZP candidates chose to highlight the person instead of the party. An average MSZP 
member placed his campaign by 1.5 units toward the personal end than a Fidesz member, 
ceteris paribus. This result is particularly interesting in the context of the previous findings, 
namely that direct electoral motivations were found to have the most prominent effect on the 
norms of campaigning. In the case of MSZP members, these motivations, however, appeared 
less profoundly on the nominal level, where Fidesz candidates dominated the competition. 
Due to the absolute majority rule on the first tier of the electoral system - and taking the 
distribution of preferences within the population which clearly disadvantaged MSZP -, it 
would have been reasonable to push the resources to the PR-level campaign (Curtice and 
Shively, 2000; Heitshusen et al., 2005; Herron, 2002; Jun and Hix, 2010; Lundberg, 2006; 
Sieberer, 2010). But this is not what seemed to happen: MSZP focused on individual 
campaigns on a greater extent than Fidesz did, indicating that the value of personalization was 
thought to be important, even if there was no real chance of winning in the constituencies. 
This supports the hypothesis that MSZP was trying to divert attention away from the utmost 
unpopular party label and focus on their candidates (Ughy, 2011). Furthermore, let us not 
forget that votes received on the nominal tier will be utilized on the national level, making 
vote-maximizing strategies beneficial even if there are no realistic chances for winning. 
 Table 2 shows the models estimating the number of personalized campaign tools. The 
dependent variable being a count, Poisson models
28
 (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; Long, 1997) 
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 It has to be noted here, that negative binomial models were estimated as well to test the effect of 
possible overdispersion within the data, but it has not proven more effective in explaining the number 
of personalized campaign tools. 
were estimated. According to the results, single member district candidacy is the most 
influential factor explaining the variance of the dependent variable: SMD candidates used 
significantly more of the listed personalized campaign tools than party list contestants
29
. 
There is nothing unexpected here; candidates running for seats on the most personalized level 
of the Hungarian electoral system evidently chose campaigning methods with a more 
profound personal focus. Interestingly, contrarily to what was seen earlier, SMD level 
experience does not affect the selection of tools. Those who were defending their seats, did 
not put themselves forward in terms of a more operational perception of campaigning. 
Campaign norms, however, handle resource allocation in a less tangible way, leaving a 
greater sweep to legislators’ perceptions on their own campaigns. This appears to underline 
the assumption that experience bears habitual relevance, as it organically constructs the 
perceptions of members about their own behaviour. Using a more concrete question, the 
relevance of these factors diminishes. 
 
Table 2. The results of Poisson models estimating the number of personalized campaign tools 
used during the 2010 campaign 
 B (s.e.) B (s.e.) 
Candidacy 1.381 (0.153)*** 1.398 (.152)*** 
Incumbent (2006-2010) .076 (.04)* .058 (.036) 
SMD MP before 2006 .041 (.048) .04 (.045) 
Local political position .188 (.057)*** .094 (.045)** 
Newcomer -.028 (.053) .051 (.046) 
Party leader .021 (.043) .000 (.0339 
Ideological distance .000 (.018) .002 (.017) 
Jobbik  -.146 (.055)*** 
KDNP  -.002 (.048) 
LMP  -.685 (.069)*** 
MSZP  .054 (.033) 
Intercept .321 (.146)** .366 (.151)*** 
N 221 221 
Wald χ2 149.18*** 569.61*** 
Entries are coefficients; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Contrasts: Candidacy - list candidates, Incumbent (2006-2010) – members not holding SMD 
mandates between 2006 and 2010, SMD MP before 2006 - has never held an SMD seat, Local 
political positions - members not holding any elected local positions, Newcomer - members 
with at least one term experience as national representatives, Party leader - backbench MPs, 
Party - Fidesz. 
Coefficients represent the change in the value of the dependent variable due to a one unit 
change in the related independent variable. 
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 The rate ratio of personalised campaign tools is almost four times as high in the case of SMD 
candidates than regarding list contestants (IRR=3.978; s.e. = .808). 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
 
 
Local political background has proven to be an important explanatory factor as well. The 
average number of personalized campaign tools is about 1.2 times higher in the case of 
members holding local positions
30
. This is partly the consequence of locally available 
resources. The majority of the tools listed in the questionnaire is used by the MPs as a part of 
their jobs as local office holders. Office hours, appearances in the local media and attending 
social gatherings are part of the everyday lives of local politicians (Keil and Papp, 2011). 
Thus, the relative costs of these tools are lower in their case. Contrarily, candidates not 
holding local office have to establish local presence in the course of the campaign, with 
additional efforts. As incumbency was also controlled for, these results do not only attach to 
local presence (as SMD members might also carry out substantial work on the local level), but 
to local presence generated by multiple office holding. 
 The results outlined above do not change when party affiliation is brought into the 
equation. A major difference between old and new parties seems to stand out. Candidates of 
the new parties (Jobbik and LMP) tend to use significantly less of the listed tools than Fidesz 
members. The major differences between Fidesz (and eventually KDNP and MSZP) and the 
newcomers showed in office hours
31
, spots in the local TV/radio
32
 and maintaining 
personalized websites
33
. In the first instance, 61.5 % of Jobbik MPs held office hours 
compared to the 78.3 % of Fidesz representatives. 57.7 % of Jobbik members appeared in the 
local electronic media, whereas 69.2 % of Fidesz MPs did, while these proportions were 57.7 
and 78.7 % with respect to personal websites. According to the data, LMP was rather passive 
regarding all of the listed tools, except the attendance of social gatherings, in which case no 
difference between members of the various parties was found
34
. 
 Turning to the last aspect of personalized campaign, Table 3 shows the results of the 
binary logistic regressions estimating the logit of touching upon local issues that were left 
unattended by the party during the campaign. Again, first tier candidates thematized their 
campaigns according to their electoral goals: they mentioned issues of local concern with a 
significantly greater probability than members who had no interest in being elected on the 
nominal level. It is no surprise that members involved in local politics also used local topics 
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 IRR = 1.2 (s.e. = .068) 
31
 χ2=36.59***, V=.416 
32
 χ2=23.6***, V=.334 
33
 χ2=15.13***, V=.269 
34
 χ2=3.704 
with a greater probability regardless of their status as candidates. Even list candidates with a 
local political background campaigned with locally relevant issues which were not picked up 
by the parties. This result sheds light on that the involvement in local politics shifts the 
perceived relative importance of local politics to national issues toward the local end. This is 
true regardless of whether the member was an SMD candidate or not. 
 
Table 3 Results of the binary logistic regression estimating the logit of touching upon local 
issues 
 B (s.e.) B (s.e.) 
Candidacy 2.153 (.445)*** 2.185 (.479)*** 
Incumbent (2006-2010) .724 (.561) .65 (.558) 
SMD MP before 2006 1.196 (1.263) .97 (1.183) 
Local political position 1.259 (.455)*** 1.015 (.46)** 
Newcomer -.413 (.465) -.18 (.495) 
Party leader .299 (.411) -.026 (.404) 
Ideological distance -.111 (.152) -.061 (.155) 
Jobbik  .521 (.654) 
KDNP  .833 (.972) 
LMP   
MSZP  .306 (.496) 
Intercept -1.48 (.619)*** -1.465 (.616)** 
N 201 199 
Wald χ2 32.82*** 30.03*** 
Pseudo R
2
 .199 .183 
Entries are coefficients; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Contrasts: Candidacy - list candidates, Incumbent (2006-2010) – members not holding SMD 
mandates between 2006 and 2010, SMD MP before 2006 - has never held an SMD seat, Local 
political positions - members not holding any elected local positions, Newcomer - members 
with at least one term experience as national representatives, Party leader - backbench MPs, 
Party - Fidesz. 
Coefficients represent the change in the value of the dependent variable due to a one unit 
change in the related independent variable. 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
 
 
The effect of seniority, party positions and ideological distance on campaign agenda seems 
almost negligible. However, their signs point to the hypothesized direction, indicating that a 
mechanism that pushes incumbents – in the sample - toward focusing more on the local level 
is in place. Only, this relation does not hold for the whole population. Interestingly, there is no 
statistically significant difference between parties in terms of the probability of raising locally 
relevant issues, although the signs are all positive which indicates that Fidesz members 
mentioned local issues with the lowest probability. Nevertheless, these tendencies call 
attention especially in light of Fidesz being the only party with a viable chance of winning on 
the nominal level: legislators of the one party with the biggest chance did bring up local issues 
with a lower magnitude than either of their competitors. This observation strengthens the 
candidates’ reliance of the party brand in the course of the 2010 electoral campaign 
(Mihályffy, 2011). This also leads to the conclusion that the most party-centered party was the 
least locally oriented as well, which contradicts the findings of Karlsen és Skogerbø (Karlsen 
and Skogerbø, 2013), who argue that these two aspects are far from being exclusive35. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The analysis presented mixed results with regards to the sub-hypotheses of the article. In most 
cases, the effect of the variables pointed to the right direction. Thus regarding the sample, 
tendencies derived from the literature are also relevant in the Hungarian setting. Taking the 
whole parliament into account, some variables affected the dependent variable to a greater 
degree than others. Of course, as we observed about 60 % of the whole population, it would 
be justifiable to argue that non-significant results should be taken more seriously as well. 
However, this study cannot take on the task of deciding which effects were strong enough to 
be taken into account and which were utterly neglectable. Remaining within the realm of 
statistical significance, three variables seem to have considerable effects in all the models. 
Firstly, the place of candidacy was proven to be a strong predictor. Legislators running for 
SMD seats ran more personalized electoral campaigns than those who were not nominated on 
the nominal level. Secondly, the role of local political background was important in the most 
cases. Local politicians put a greater emphasis on themselves and their constituencies than 
MPs not directly involved in local politics. Thirdly, parties do not relate to personalization the 
same way. Repeating Zsolt Enyedi’s words36, this is probably not about party strategies, but 
party culture. The hypothesis distinguishing between the effects of old and new parties is in 
concordance with this. In the case of older parties, it is a substantial part of the party culture 
that legislators fill in constituency level positions based on the fact that these parties are the 
ones that have substantial experience with SMD representation. These parties might perceive 
SMD position to have a greater prestige in comparison with parties which have limited 
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 Note, that they demonstrated this relationship in the case of Norway. 
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 During the private defence of the doctoral dissertation of the author at the Corvinus Univserity of 
Budapest (June 4, 2013). 
experience either due to their short history or their small party status. Nevertheless, as 
campaign efforts are in the centre of this investigation, the roles of strategies cannot be 
overcome either. This is supported by the difference between Fidesz and MSZP. While these 
two parties were “baffled” into the same camp by cultural mechanisms, strategic 
considerations create a steady distinction between them. While Fidesz leant on the party 
brand, the candidates of MSZP tried to neutralize the unpopularity of the party by putting a 
greater emphasis on personalization. 
 The main hypothesis of the article was that personalization cannot be overlooked even 
in a party-centred environment. Irrespective of who hold the right to decide over nomination, 
the existence of the nominal tier brings considerable variation into the campaign strategies of 
the individual members. With regards to causal mechanisms, however, the focus is different 
in the cases of party- and candidate-centred systems. The effects might come from individual 
motivations, but under strict party-centeredness, personalization has to be looked at from the 
parties’ viewpoints as well. This means, that we have to maintain the possibility that the 
certain MPs and candidates are not independent actors, but the vehicles of party strategies. 
The strong effect of party affiliation suggests firm party-level campaign strategies to which 
members of the parties aligned to when balancing between candidate- and party-centeredness. 
However, at the same time, when including party affiliation in the models, the effect of 
candidacy on the nominal level stayed strong. This suggests that even parties that built their 
campaign on the party label allowed for a certain level of personalization on the first tier of 
the system. By the reason of the party-centeredness, we could conclude that it was the party’s 
expectation to personalize in order to maximize the number of votes. 
 However, the significance of local political positions supports the role of effects that 
stem from the political positions of individual MPs. If we could identify factors that are not 
connected to electoral rules (therefore not tied to possible party strategies for gaining votes) 
and that (theoretically speaking) place special emphasis on personal motivations (like local 
political background), then it should be concluded that even under heavily monitored 
campaign behaviour and in countries that appear to traditionally support party-centeredness, 
personal motivations should not be underestimated either. Based on the results of this sample, 
local politicians appeared to find their ways to express constituency concerns, to utilize their 
local resources in the course of a national electoral campaign, and perceived their campaigns 
as being rather personalized than party centred. Most importantly, they did this irrespective of 
their electoral positions as SMD candidates. Thus personalisation is a trait for a specific 
segment of Hungarian legislators, which they utilize even if they are not interested in 
representing the local area on the nominal level. 
 
 
Explanations 
Fidesz  Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség/Fidesz – Hungarian Civil Alliance 
KDNP  Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt/Christian Democratic People’s Party 
MSZP  Magyar Szocialista Párt/Hungarian Socialist Party 
Jobbik  Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom/Jobbik, the Movement for a Better 
Hungary 
LMP  Lehet Más a Politika/Politics Can Be Different 
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Figure 1. The distribution of campaign norms in 2010 (%) 
 
Figure 2. Aggregated usage of the different personalized campaign tools (count variable, %) 
 
